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Although the political and economic bankruptcy of the erstwhile Leninist regimes in Central and 
Eastern Europe has triggered radical societal transformations, the effect on daily prison life 
remains largely uncharted. This semi-ethnographic study, one of the first of its genre in the 
region, documents a prisoner hierarchy in post-Soviet Ukraine. Originating in the slums and 
prisons of the Russian Empire and solidifying in communist gaols and labour camps, the 
Ukrainian prison underworld continues to evolve. In this article, I argue that the post-
independence shifts in penal policies and prison practices, combined with changes in prisoner 
demographics, have been altering the Ukrainian prisoner power structure. I contend that whilst 
functional and deeply institutionalised, the prisoner hierarchy is facing serious challenges, not 
least a legitimacy deficit, and I discuss the potential repercussions for internal power dynamics 
and prison order. 
Keywords: Ukraine, prisoner society, carceral self-rule, prisoner hierarchy, extralegal 
governance, prisoners 
 
The ‘society of captives’ that Sykes described in 1958 remains a standard against which scholars 
examine prison worlds. His was a constellation of prisoner argot roles embedded in the ‘inmate 
culture’ of professed, yet relative, prisoner solidarity and opposition to formal authorities, with 
whom prisoners created a tenuous, arguably unavoidable, peace of mutual compromise. 
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However, DiIulio (1987) questions this theoretical convention and argues, contra Sykes (1958), 
that staff-prisoner collusion in power negotiation and devolution and the ascendancy of some 
prisoners over others is avoidable in prison governance. Indeed, prisons around the globe differ 
enormously in the format and role of the prisoner organisations they engender: from loose 
aggregates with a barely palpable ‘inmate subculture’ (Grapendaal 1990), to communities with 
pronounced prisoner argot roles and behavioural fiats (Morris and Morris 1963), to rigid prisoner 
hierarchies with an attendant suprastructure of elaborate ideology and minute rules (Oleinik 
2003). Furthermore, prisoner institutions constantly evolve, responding to changes in and outside 
prisons. In the US itself, the Sykesian ‘society of captives’ has undergone a dramatic 
metamorphosis since the advent of neo-liberal policies and the ascent of gangs (Bronson 2006; 
Hunt et al. 1993; Simon 2000; Wacquant 2002). Social and ideological shifts in other countries 
have transformed the inner world of prisons there too (e.g. Birkbeck 2011; Crewe 2009; Liebling 
and Williams 2017; Nunes Dias and Salla 2017; Phillips 2012; Ricciardelli 2014; Tertsakian 
2008; Ugelvik 2014). 
Nonetheless, even when the Sykesean reputation-based model of traditional prisoner 
argot roles gives way to the community responsibility system of gang rule, prisoner extralegal 
self-rule retains its essential functions (Skarbek 2014). As Gambetta (1993) and Skarbek (2014) 
contend, when the state fails to deliver genuine protection and mediation, the underworld fills the 
void by providing extralegal governance that curbs social conflict, promotes relative peace, and 
subjugates self-interested and often predatory individual behaviour for the welfare of the 
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majority.1 Myriad examples of under-resourced, and more importantly, understaffed, prisons 
around the globe suggest the informal social control of prisoner extralegal governance emerges 
in response to the perennial need for regulation and security that collectives of people and their 
(especially illicit) markets require. Such prisons also vividly demonstrate the human cost of 
extralegal governance: notably, the normalisation of discrimination of some prisoners by others 
and inter-prisoner violence, albeit in arguably controlled form (Antillano 2017; Birkbeck 2011; 
Darke 2013; Kaminski 2004; King and Valensia 2014; Martin 2014; Nunes Dias and Salla 2017; 
Oleinik 2003).  
The political and economic bankruptcy of the erstwhile Leninist regimes in Central and 
Eastern Europe triggered radical societal transformation and the reorganisation of state 
governance, but the effect of the sweeping social and political changes on daily prison life 
remains largely uncharted. We do know that penal reforms in post-Soviet countries can disrupt 
the inner prison world but preserve significant Soviet legacies (Oleinik 2003; 2006; Pallot and 
Piacentini 2012; Piacentini and Katz 2017; Piacentini and Slade 2015; Slade 2016). Whilst 
adding to our understanding of the post-Soviet prison universe, these important studies, as a rule, 
have not specifically examined the fate of prisoner hierarchies. Apart from Pallot and 
Piacentini’s (2012) investigation of Russian women’s prisons, Anton Oleinik stands as a notable 
exception, charting the prisoner social and normative structure, mostly in Russia, with occasional 
references to Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Relying on interviews and questionnaires, often in the 
                                                          
1 E.g., the Brazilian PCC gang brandishes ‘peace, justice, and freedom’ as its motto (Nunes Dias 
and Salla 2013). 
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company of senior prison officials2 or having access to certain prisoners, Oleinik recognises that 
participant observation yields the most adequate data to understand the daily ‘constitution’ of the 
prison world (2003).3  
This article adds to existing knowledge of the daily life of a post-Soviet prison by 
examining inter-prisoner power relations in a Ukrainian medium-security prison for men. 
Referring to a semi-ethnographic study, I demonstrate how prisoner self-organisation ameliorates 
certain prison privations, foremost of which is physical insecurity, despite being continuously 
reproduced and challenged by human agents in situ. I argue that shifts in penal policies and 
prison practices, combined with changes in prisoner demographics, are altering the Ukrainian 
prisoner power structure that originated in the slums and prisons of the Russian Empire and 
solidified in Soviet gaols and labour camps. My findings substantiate the argument of Gambetta 
(1993) and Skarbek (2014) that extralegal governance endures, its metamorphoses 
notwithstanding, for as long as the state fails to meet the demand for security and mediation. 
This article consists of four sections. I begin by giving a brief overview of the extant 
literature on prisoner self-organisation and extralegal governance. I then outline the general 
features of Ukrainian penality following post-independence democratisation. I explain the 
study’s methods and the research site before discussing the power structure of Ukrainian 
prisoners: first noting its role in sustaining prison order and then discussing its transformations in 
                                                          
2 Similarly, Piacentini (2004) decided to discard some of her prisoner interviews in Russian 
institutions, as the presence of officials rendered the data unreliable. See also Moczydłowski 
(1992) and Pallot and Piacentini (2012). 
3 See Giddens (1984) on the constitution of society and structuration theory. 
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consonance with the socio-legal developments in this post-Soviet country. I conclude by 
highlighting the unintended consequences of the penal reforms and discussing potential 
implications. 
 
Prisoner Universes across Borders 
One of many prison paradoxes is that although living with other prisoners constitutes a 
significant ‘pain of imprisonment’ (Sykes 1958), prisoners interact, cooperate, and self-organise 
(Cressey and Krassowski 1958; although see Crewe 2009; Mathiesen 1965; Reed 2003).4 
Prisoner self-organisation, whilst often linked to criminal organisations outside prisons, often 
serves to attenuate the difficulties of co-habitation by regulating inter-prisoner relations and 
maximising predictability in potentially volatile settings (Antillano 2017; Crewe 2009; Darke 
and Garces 2017; Einat and Wall 2006; Kaminski 2004; Moczydłowski 1992; Narag and Jones 
2017; Nunes Dias and Salla 2013; Skarbek 2014; Trammell 2009). The salience and strength of 
prisoner self-organisation in men’s prisons (henceforth prisoner self-rule) varies in time and 
across institutions and borders. The literature suggests that in the context of ‘state abandonment’ 
(Darke and Garces 2017), i.e. where the state has diminished or abdicated its normative and 
practical role in prison governance, prisoner formations fill the void by ‘carceral self-rule’ 
(Antillano 2017) through rigid prisoner hierarchies and minute rules upheld by pervasive 
surveillance and swift and harsh punishment. Skarbek (2014) and Trammell (2009) convincingly 
demonstrate that despite rivalry and animosity, gangs often work together to establish a 
                                                          
4 Living with other humans can be also one of the few joys of prison life (Pallot and Piacentini 
2012; Sparks et al. 1996). 
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predictable order and curb violence. In other words, they provide extralegal governance that 
fulfils the same functions as earlier forms of prisoner self-rule – offering protection and 
arbitration but also satisfying such needs as belonging, ‘image-building’, material enrichment, or 
entertainment (see Sánchez-Jankowski 2003).  
Although traditional Sykesian ‘societies of captives’ disapprove of excessive and 
arbitrary inter-prisoner violence, they nonetheless yield to the ‘might is right’ principle (see 
‘toughs’ in Sykes 1958, ‘Robber Barons’ in Morris and Morris 1963 or grypsmen in Kaminski 
2004). Conversely, carceral self-rule not only proscribes the arbitrary use of violence in inter-
prisoner conflicts but also institutionalises informal adjudicators (Nunes Dias and Salla 2013; 
Oleinik 2003). In effect, such prisoner organisations emulate and assume the responsibilities of 
the weak or withdrawn state (e.g. Darke and Garces 2017; Morelle 2014; Tertsakian 2008; also 
Gambetta 1993; Skarbek 2014). 
Prisoner self-rule operates through stratification, despite its common profession of 
fraternity (e.g. Nunes Dias and Salla 2013). Although the criteria for assigning male prisoners 
(henceforth prisoners) to a particular stratum differ across institutions and jurisdictions and over 
time, those considered ‘unmanly’ usually end up at the bottom, with the ‘manly’ and powerful at 
the top. Most prisoners reside somewhere in between: either aspiring to the top or balancing in a 
precarious middle, in constant fear of relegation (Symkovych 2017b). The ‘othering’ practice of 
(self-)division into ‘us and them’ serves to maintain group cohesiveness and intra-group control 
(Skarbek 2014; see Ugelvik 2014 on Derrida’s différance).  
Prisoner self-organisation in the former Soviet Union, despite the omnipotent state, 
resembled that of carceral self-rule. First, during the Great Terror, Communist labour camps 
were so populous that their administrators could not maintain a semblance of order; nor could 
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they assure the massive production required without prisoners being responsible for all major 
duties, including guarding (Applebaum 2003; Khlevniuk 2004; Oleinik 2003). Eventually, both 
the authorities and the criminal elite realised the mutual benefits of cooperation, thus 
consolidating the prisoner structure and institutionalising prisoner extralegal governance 
(Cressey and Krassowski 1958; Galeotti 2008; Varese 1998; see Gambetta 1993; Skarbek 2014). 
Second, this Soviet prisoner self-rule, whilst building on the underworld tradition of urbanised 
street criminals and czarist prisons, enjoyed a measure of empirical legitimacy by curbing inter-
prisoner violence and being better at smooth prison administration than the grossly unjust and 
repressive Communist state (Oleinik 2003). Gambetta (1993) emphasises that the underworld 
may possess better resources to provide a more efficient governance vis-à-vis state institutions: 
better networks, information (including intelligence), or enforcement tools.5  
Following the dismantling of the Communist regime, the resources at the disposal of the 
Ukrainian state changed. What effect this has had on the well-developed Soviet-era prisoner self-
organisation remains mostly unknown. Accordingly, in this article, I investigate the changing 
practical and normative standing of the prisoner hierarchy and extralegal governance in a 
Ukrainian prison in the context of new penal regimes and changing prisoner demographics.  
  
Ukrainian Penal Regime 
Since restoring independence in 1991, Ukraine has been liberalising its penal regime. As a pull 
factor and a precondition for its aspiring membership in trans-European institutions, the country 
                                                          
5 Nonetheless, the state and underworld may share their resources, engendering concurrent 
governance (Stephenson 2017). 
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has acceded to all major international human rights instruments, discontinued the death penalty, 
established the office of the Parliamentary Ombudsman of Human Rights (ex officio the National 
Preventative Mechanism), and gradually reduced incarceration more than threefold. Judges 
remand fewer cases into custody, and prison sentences are much shorter than during the 
Communist era. Early release on parole, a marginal practice in the former USSR, is now 
commonplace, with 10-20% prisoners paroled annually. Today, Ukraine houses 60,000 
prisoners, and its prison rate constitutes 167 prisoners per 100,000 general population, compared 
to neighbouring Poland’s 193, Russia’s 424, and Ukraine’s own 443 in 2000 (Institute for 
Criminal Policy Research 2017).  
Despite this liberalisation, as in other post-Soviet countries, the reforms have been 
patchy, not always transforming into enduring practices on the ground, and many Soviet legacies 
persist (Pallot and Piacentini 2012; Piacentini and Katz 2017; Piacentini and Slade 2015). The 
Committee against Torture continuously highlights serious problems that plague Ukrainian 
police stations and prisons. Ukraine remains the most corrupt country in Europe, with the police 
and judiciary enjoying very low public trust (Symkovych 2017a). Not surprisingly, the majority 
of Ukrainian prisoners have underprivileged backgrounds and half have served prior custodial 
sentences (Prison Portal of Donetsk Memorial 2010). 
The Ukrainian Penitentiary Service (UkrPS) separated from the Ministry of the Interior in 
1998 and now constitutes a department within the Ministry of Justice. Even so, it remains a 
militarised organisation, preserving its former rhetoric and some law-enforcement functions. The 
UkrPS has retained Soviet-style group housing and continues to emphasise prison labour as the 
means of correction and re-socialisation, even though the prison industry is in crisis, struggling 
to employ prisoners, secure orders, and pay prisoners adequately. Nor can the UkrPS employ or 
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retain staff, with 13.6% unfilled positions, translating into significant understaffing and 
overworked and demoralised officers. Taken together, the Soviet legacies and severe 
understaffing necessitate a degree of power devolution to prisoners, thus perpetuating, as I go on 
to demonstrate, the prisoner self-organisation and its extralegal governance that characterised 
Soviet prisons.  
 
A Study in a Ukrainian Prison 
Whereas the first classical studies of the ‘prison communities’ in the US employed ethnographic 
methods, the ongoing ‘eclipse of ethnography’ (Wacquant 2002) means that, in many cases, 
scholars collect data through interviews with ex-prisoners or during brief carceral visits (e.g. 
Morelle 2014; Reiter 2014; Trammell 2009). Previous studies in post-Soviet prisons could not 
employ sustained participant observation, so they have relied chiefly on questionnaires and 
interviews in and outside prisons (Oleinik 2003; 2006; Pallot and Piacentini 2012; Piacentini 
2004; Slade 2016). 
In my case, during the protracted process of acquiring research permission, the UkrPS 
suggested I interview some senior staff in the Headquarters in lieu of fieldwork in prisons. By 
sheer luck, and after two years of making persistent visits, telephoning and writing letters to 
UkrPS Headquarters, attending draining and degrading meetings, and pursuing alternative routes, 
both formal and informal, I was eventually allowed to conduct a study inside a Ukrainian prison. 
Even then, my access was precarious, as the prison commander occasionally suspended it, once 
for 10 days (Symkovych 2017b). Although I did not have a choice in the selection of a research 
site and was not in control of my daily access, my research design ultimately amounted to what 
Crewe (2009) terms a ‘semi-ethnographic’ study and Reed (2003) considers ‘quasi-
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ethnography’; more specifically, it comprised sustained participant observation, months of 
informal conversations in all parts of the prison, and eventually long and comprehensive 
interviews.  
The UkrPS allowed research in its ‘model’ institution, a medium-security prison for 
sentenced men in the Kyiv region. The model status meant that the prison received regular visits 
from Headquarters and served as a site for ‘practical training’ for officers from across Ukraine 
attending induction and refresher courses in the nearby UkrPS Training Academy. For the five 
months of my fieldwork, I lodged in the Academy, where I spent evenings discussing with 
hundreds of officers the situation in other Ukrainian prisons of all security categories and 
reputations.6  
  The prison in question resembled a typical post-Soviet prison for sentenced men: it 
comprised a vast industrial zone with an adjacent residential zone subdivided into local zones, 
each containing dormitories for two to four squads, with about 50 prisoners in each. The 
prisoners, mostly recidivists, reflected the national prison population. Two thirds were between 
20 and 45 years old, and the majority were serving sentences for property offences and seemed 
to come from underprivileged socio-economic backgrounds. There were also prisoners convicted 
of drug offences, murder, rape, and some other crimes. By law, unless they were retirement age, 
prisoners had to work. About a tenth had support or maintenance positions, and the rest worked 
in various workshops: sewing, welding, wood curving, metalwork, stone splitting or scrap 
material sorting (see Moczydłowski 1992; Piacentini 2004).  
                                                          
6 Mornings were hectic; I could only have brief conversations whilst queuing or shaving in 
communal showers or over a quick breakfast in the company of officers. 
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The officers, all uniformed and having a quasi-military rank, were, like the prisoners, 
mostly 20-45 years old. Due to understaffing, about 20-30 officers (much fewer after 5 pm) were 
in charge of about 800 prisoners. They had to spend considerable time attending meetings and 
doing paperwork, thus making a degree of power devolution to prisoners imperative (see 
Symkovych 2017a).  
The fieldwork comprised almost daily visits, including weekends and national holidays. I 
had to accompany an officer, but after about a month, the officers and, tacitly, the prison 
commander realised they could trust me to spend considerable time unsupervised. I still relied on 
officers to enter and leave the secure compound and to move between the sections, as I did not 
have keys (and chose to refuse help from prisoners with illegally cut keys). I spent time chatting 
with prisoners and officers, as well as observing daily life in the workshops, dormitories, in the 
trans-zone checkpoint, segregation unit, and local zones.  
Prisoners and officers (including the prison commander and other senior staff) did not 
initially comprehend my interest or my research approach (see DiIulio 1987; Sparks et al. 1996), 
as they expected a researcher to administer questionnaires and leave the same day, but they 
gradually accepted me as a feature of the prison. During this introductory period, I underwent 
what can be considered informal tests and vetting. As the information flowed rapidly, and as 
most prisoners and officers became very friendly and regularly invited me for coffee (drunk from 
the same mug in a circle to underscore trust and fraternity), I assume I passed these tests (see 
Moczydłowski 1992; Ugelvik 2014). I was careful to avoid being seen regularly with the same 
persons or the same category of prisoners (e.g. from the same informal caste) or officers (from 
the same department or rank) and eventually managed to speak and spend time with almost all 
officers and about a third of the prisoners. Satisfied with the degree of data saturation, I selected 
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21 officers and 20 prisoners for long semi-structured interviews. These respondents reflected, 
respectively, the composition of staff and prisoners: they belonged to different formal and 
informal groups, enjoyed different reputations, and had variegated prison experiences. Most 
interviews were in private and often lasted over several sessions. I advised my research 
participants on the voluntary nature of their contribution and on their rights; the majority 
consented to voice recording. In addition to prisoners and officers in the research prison, I held 
long semi-structured interviews with five officers in the Training Academy to discuss more 
comprehensively the situation across Ukraine’s vast penal complex. 
The content analysis of my observations, post-conversation notes, and interview 
recordings generated a kaleidoscope of themes. In this article, I draw solely on those related to 
the prison hierarchy and extralegal governance. Although my findings, to which I now turn, are 
not generalisable, the theme saturation and the hundreds of hours of conversations and interviews 
in the prison and in the Academy suggest the broad parameters of the prisoner power structure 
and extralegal governance exist in other Ukrainian prisons for men. 
 
Prisoner Power Structure: Its Composition and Function 
In the research prison, all inter-prisoner relations were embedded in the prisoner hierarchy that 
Ukraine inherited from the Soviet Union. Broadly stated, it comprised four tiers: the criminal 
elite at the top (smotryáschi and other blatní), the lads (muzhyký) in the middle, the collaborators 
(kozlý) schematically close to the bottom but de facto on par with the criminal elite, and the 
lowermost outcasts (opúscheni/obrázheni/petukhý). This stratification resembles the hierarchy in 
Polish prisons and is identical to the one in Russia  (Kaminski 2004; Moczydłowski 1992; 
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Oleinik 2003). It operated in the normative and ideological milieu of the ponyáttya, a Ukrainian 
version of the ‘inmate code’ (see Symkovych forthcoming). 
The prisoner caste affiliation (másty) was determined the first time a prisoner arrived in a 
remand prison, following ceaseless observation, probing, and extensive interviewing by other 
prisoners (see Kaminski 2004; Moczydłowski 1992). Information and reputation are crucial in 
extralegal governance, and prisoner organisations around the world devote their resources to 
establish and enhance them (Gambetta 1993; Skarbek 2014). As in Polish or Israeli prisons 
(Einat and Wall 2006; Kaminski 2004; Moczydłowski 1992), information gathering involved 
extensive testing to establish a person’s history and (essentialised) character, thus maximising 
predictability:  
 
First time you are in a SIZO [remand prison], you are scared! You are tested day and 
night. You know that how you respond will determine the rest of your life. One mistake – 
and you can spend all your life scrubbing hole-stools [by being assigned to the outcasts]. 
– Don’t take it as all tests are cruel. ‘Registration’ [propisnáya/propíska] also determines 
how smart you are, what your personality is. For example, they put a towel at the cell’s 
doorstep. If you wipe your feet, rather than stepping over it or picking it up, it means 
you’ve got a strong personality or that you’ve been to prison before and know the rules. 
Or, you are forced under the bunk bed [náry]. You are allowed to request anything that 
you think might help you to get out, but otherwise they won’t let you out. It is really 
funny as people ask for random things but they don’t help them to get out. Do you know 
what a correct answer is? You have to request someone who would take over from you 
(smyényshchik, a relief). (Prisoner-lad) 
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Once assigned, a status remained relatively constant, although downward mobility constituted a 
real threat. Unlike in Poland, the Ukrainian prisoners could not restore their caste membership 
(cf. Kaminski 2004; Moczydłowski 1992). A newly arrived prisoner claiming a certain status 
remained in limbo until other prisoners could verify his reputation, personally or through 
informal messaging (malyáva), and increasingly through illicit telephones (see Cressey and 
Krassowski 1958; Kaminski 2004; Moczydłowski 1992; Oleinik 2003).   
 
Criminal Elite 
The criminal elite’s main function constituted maintenance and interpretation of the ‘inmate 
code’, chiefly during the informal adjudication of inter-prisoner conflicts. Each prisoner squad 
had its informal adjudicator, smotryáschy, and several other blatní ‘without a portfolio’ (see 
Kaminski 2004 and Moczydłowski 1992 on grypsmen/git in Poland). One senior smotryáschi 
(polozhénets if approved by the vor, a top-ranking member of the outside criminal elite) was in 
charge of the prison, acting as both an appellate and a liaison with the underworld on the outside 
and in other prisons. The criminal elite demonstrated a defiance of prison officials and prison 
rules and professed the virtues of informal norms and traditions. Their language (múrka or fénya) 
contained a higher percentage of prison-specific and criminal slang words than that of other 
prisoners or officers (see Einat and Wall 2007, Kaminski 2004; Moczydłowski 1992, Oleinik 
2003, and Reed 2003 on prisoner argot). Traditionally, a prisoner can become a member of the 
criminal elite when approved by existing members, if he is willing to endure repression from the 
authorities. He has to meet the general masculine requirements and certain criminal elite 
expectations: inter alia, psychological fortitude, ability to keep his word, and manifest 
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opposition to the state and prison administration (Oleinik 2003; Varese 1998; see Kaminski 2004 
on 'baptism' among Polish grypsmen).  
Apart from administering extralegal governance, the criminal elite generated, controlled, 
and distributed the informal mutual-aid fund (obshchák). Through it, they legitimised the 
informal prisoner organisation in general and themselves in particular by demonstrating their 
‘genuine’ care for other prisoners and bolstering the ideal of carceral fraternity, as this contrasted 
with the state’s indifference: 
 
I am here to take care of lads. Here is a situation: an arestánt [prisoner] arrives, he has no 
toothbrush, no cigarettes – nothing. Who will take care of him? The administration? No! 
We – cons – will give him everything he needs, before he sorts himself out. A man needs 
kurýty-varýty [to smoke and to eat]. If he doesn’t gréyetsa [i.e. does not have relatives to 
supply food parcels], he will be without a razor, without socks, without cigarettes and tea 
for a month or more, before he gets some money on his account. – And you know, the 
money in a prisoner’s account is often virtual. And in the canteen there are only a lipstick 
and sunflower seeds. (Prisoner-criminal elite) 
 
Through their opposition to the formal administration and their demonstrative care for prisoner 
welfare, the criminal elite posited themselves as an alternative to, and substitute for, the unjust 
and uncaring state. As I discuss elsewhere, the underworld’s private justice enjoyed a measure of 
legitimacy and the incessant mutual surveillance and tight self-control, along with the perceived 
inevitability, swiftness, and harshness of sanctions, ensured the rule of informal law (Symkovych 
forthcoming; cf. Oleinik 2003 on prisoners’ ‘voluntary submission’ to informal norms). Its utility 
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and a measure of legitimacy notwithstanding, extralegal governance was sustained by the 
certainty of its stern enforcement and punishment (Gambetta 1993; Skarbek 2014; Symkovych 
2017c). 
 
Collaborators 
As in many other jurisdictions, Ukrainian prisons cannot operate without power devolution and 
the extensive involvement of prisoners in everyday operation (Darke 2013; Sykes 1958; 
Tertsakian 2008). As I detail elsewhere, severe understaffing and traditional ideological and 
practical reliance on prison industry has made the role of prisoner-trustees indispensable 
(Symkovych 2017a). These prisoners – collaborators – wielded significant power, despite 
prisoner discourse portraying them as traitors of the prisoner world. Like trustees in other 
countries, the Ukrainian collaborators in this prison enjoyed numerous perks, including illicit 
mobile phones, sometimes private rooms and cut keys, as well as excellent prospects of parole, 
even though the authorities referred to them as primi inter pares (see Darke 2013; Morelle 2014). 
Not least, such jobs can also impart a sense of importance and agency (Narag and Jones 2017; 
see Tertsakian 2008 on escapism).  
 As both the official and alternative discourses presented collaborators as an extension of 
the prison administration, reporting illicit activities, such as gambling, fights, or planned drug 
trafficking, was viewed as part of the ‘job description’ of collaborators. Thus, collaborators knew 
other prisoners would despise them: 
 
I don’t give a fuck, really. If other cons liked me, if I were chatty and [over]friendly with 
them, the administration would think that I am a bad orderly […] They [the authorities] 
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wouldn’t trust me. – And there is always a possibility I can be finished [i.e. killed] by 
some unhappy prisoners. (Prisoner-collaborator) 
 
As the informal norms discouraged prisoners from too close communication with 
officers, collaborators liaised with the administration on behalf of other prisoners. However, 
unlike in some other jurisdictions, in this prison, the collaborators did not hold formal power, 
such as the ability to dispense official incentives, nor were they sanctioned to discipline other 
prisoners informally (Birkbeck 2011; Cressey and Krassowski 1958; Darke 2013; DiIulio 1987; 
King and Valensia 2014). Consequently, despite being power brokers, these prisoners always 
depended on staff, thus rendering them vulnerable and cautious: 
 
Yes, it’s our job to help the administration. However, I don’t run to report everything. And 
you know why? Because it’s me who lives here, with all these people. If I mess up 
someone’s life, the administration is not gonna help me […] Recently there’s been a new 
trend. They [prison authorities] use you [a collaborator] like a condom that is thrown away 
after use. They don’t care what’s gonna happen to you after you’re back [in the main 
prisoner body]. (Prisoner-collaborator)  
 
This claim was backed up by others; I spoke to disgruntled former collaborators who said the 
administration had arbitrarily removed them from posts (see also Liebling and Williams 2017; 
Narag and Jones 2017).  Even though this was a ‘red zone’ prison – so called because the formal 
administration held the upper hand and collaborators were relatively safe, I heard stories of 
prisoners murdering orderlies in some Ukrainian ‘black zone’ prisons. Such precariousness had 
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two major consequences. First, collaborators’ loyalty to the administration was limited. Second, 
given ‘enhanced panopticism’ (Pallot and Piacentini 2012) and constant threat of replacement, 
collaborators, to safeguard their privileged position, rarely engaged in serious violations of 
prison rules, such as drug trafficking, nor could they afford to abuse their informal power. This 
contrasts with other jurisdictions (and the Soviet Gulag) where authorities endow trustees with a 
surplus of power, thereby giving violence and abuse carte blanche (Applebaum 2003; King and 
Valensia 2014; Varese 1998).  
 
Lads 
Most prisoners did not position themselves against the authorities, but nor did they actively assist 
them. These prisoners, known in the Ukrainian prison argot as lads (muzhyký), expressed a 
strong determination to ‘do their own time’, avoiding as much conflict as possible with either 
other prisoners or administration. They generally followed both official and informal rules. This 
stratum consisted of prisoners from all age groups and walks of life with a wide range of 
intellectual and moral qualities. Although some enjoyed the respect of other prisoners and even 
officers, they did not seek a leadership position because of the desire to remain unaligned and 
progress through their sentence towards an early release. The informal norms allowed lads to 
work in prison industry – unlike the criminal elite. Given that the general welfare of the 
prisoners, including the quality and amount of food, comfort (prison heating), and the variety of 
goods available in the prison canteen, depended on the output of prison industry, lads were, in 
effect, the breadwinners. Thus, the welfare of lads constituted a priority for the administration 
and criminal elite alike. 
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Lads could express opinions and vote during informal meetings, normally chaired by the 
criminal elite. Even so, whereas the opinion of some lads carried weight, others were de facto 
excluded. In practice, as an umbrella concept, lads encompassed ‘wheeler-dealers’ (barýgi), a 
few non-ostracised ‘rats’ (those caught or suspected of stealing from fellow prisoners), ‘tramps’ 
(chykhaný), ‘weasels’ (shnyrí), and various other ‘skunks’ (gádsyka másty) (see Einat and Wall 
2006 on Israeli prison argots and Kaminski 2004 on 'suckers' in a Polish prison). In sum, the 
members of this large and diverse stratum epitomised the strategy of an ‘ordinary’ prisoner: an 
expedient transition through a sentence with minimal discomfort and maximum avoidance of 
formal repressions and informal ostracism. 
 
Outcasts 
The underworld ostracised and relegated to the bottom of the hierarchy those who failed to live 
up to the expected masculine standard. The exclusion of these prisoners – outcasts – was both 
physical and symbolical. Physically, the outcasts’ beds and tables stood at a distance from those 
of the rest of the prisoner population. As in Polish and Russian prisons (Kaminski 2004; 
Moczydłowski 1992; Oleinik 2003), the Ukrainian informal norms outlawed physical contact 
with this caste in the form of a handshake or touching their belongings (and vice versa). 
Symbolically, the prisoner world equated outcasts with women, and to emphasise the social 
inferiority defining the patriarchal world, non-ostracised prisoners referred to the outcasts in 
derogatory, gendered, often sexual, words, such as ‘queers’ or ‘poofs’ (pídary or pidarásy). 
However, unlike other prison ‘societies’, the Ukrainian prison’s informal law prohibited sexual 
or financial abuse of these prisoners, but some did provide sexual services (Symkovych 2017c). 
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A prisoner could become an outcast for two reasons. First, prisoners could ostracise 
somebody for serious violations of the ‘inmate code’, such as stealing from other prisoners, 
arbitrary use of force, informing that had led to grave consequences, and any other transgression 
deemed ‘below the dignity of a man’. For this reason, most sex offenders and those who 
committed crimes against children were automatically ostracised and even raped in the past (see 
Crewe 2009; Einat and Wall 2006; Ricciardelli 2014; Sparks et al. 1996; Sykes 1958). Second, a 
prisoner could be ostracised if word got around that he had been anally or orally penetrated, with 
no statute of limitations and no mitigation if he were a rape victim or tricked (for similarities 
with Poland see Kaminski 2004 or Moczydłowski 1992). Finally, because failing to live up to the 
masculine ideal was open to interpretation, a man could be ostracised – irreversibly – for even 
trivial informal misdemeanours, although to maintain the legitimacy of the informal norms, the 
‘inmate code’ stipulated that a false accusation could result in ostracism. Although the Ukrainian 
underworld outlawed rape or exploitation of outcasts, the existence of this ‘other’ group 
functioned as a deterrent: it served as a constant and visible reminder to adhere to the informal 
norms. The alternative was to be treated as a lesser, if not subhuman, being. My research 
participants uniformly justified this practice by espousing platitudes of social Darwinism and 
patriarchal discourse censuring of subordinate masculinities coalesced with essentialism (see 
Tamanaha 2004 on shared beliefs and the ‘mirror thesis’). Even the interviewed outcasts mostly 
accepted their predicament by blaming themselves, ‘the mother Nature’, or bad luck. During the 
five months of the fieldwork, I did not encounter anybody who questioned the morality and 
acceptability of the status quo. 
 
Tenuous Peace: Functions of Prisoner Self-rule 
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Even though it institutionalised discrimination, demanded incessant self-restraint, and condoned 
the virulent surveillance of others, this informal prisoner self-rule concurrently ensured relatively 
peaceful co-habituation. In a discussion of gangs, Sánchez-Jankowski (2003) argues that 
approximate power parity breeds a continuous, generally violent, struggle until a winner 
emerges. The prisoner stratification I observed granted individuals a degree of confidence in and 
assurance of their position – even if some populated the bottom – in what could otherwise be a 
volatile and violent environment (e.g. Kaminski 2004; Kauffman 1988; Skarbek 2014; Trammell 
2009). As this arrangement ensured a measure of ‘ontological security’ (Giddens 1984), the 
majority of prisoners in my study believed this model of prisoner self-rule was the only safe way 
to survive incarceration. First, the en masse housing and the vast industrial zone, combined with 
understaffing, limited direct formal supervision and provision of safety (i.e., protection). Second, 
many inter-prisoner disputes stemmed from illicit activities, e.g. involving gambling or drugs 
(see Skarbek 2014). In neither case could formal authorities meet the prisoner demand for 
arbitration or security. Following Gambetta (1993), the underworld filled in this governance 
void, as one of the prisoners explained: 
 
There is no way to live [in prison] without ponyátiya [informal norms]. Take this situation: 
two cons [cannot come to an agreement] over drugs. What shall they do? Go and ask the 
Master [Khozyáin, prison commander] to resolve the disagreement? [Laughs cynically.] 
Do you think it would be better if they took out knives and deal with it this way? 
 
As I explain elsewhere, the informal norms and prisoner adjudication system enjoyed a degree of 
legitimacy, especially when compared to the corrupt and historically unjust state with its often 
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repressive, sometimes unreasonable, and overtly selectively enforced laws (Symkovych 2017a; 
forthcoming). Furthermore, the perceived certainty of punishment for informal transgressions, 
amplified by group housing and the normative requirement to report to the criminal elite any 
observed transgressions of the ‘inmate code’, ensured the rule of informal law, even though both 
overt and covert transgressions most certainly occurred (Symkovych 2017c). This informal law 
solidified an authoritarian prisoner ‘society’ whose empirical legitimacy rested on its delivery of 
a relatively safe and predictable environment, permitting violence only in prescribed 
circumstances, chiefly as punishment following informal adjudication (see Gambetta 1993; 
Nunes Dias and Salla 2013; Skarbek 2014; Symkovych forthcoming). However, the relative 
peace came at a moral and human cost: othering and discrimination of the minority, invasive 
surveillance of others, rigid self-restraint, and normalisation of violence, albeit mostly in the 
form of a deterrent (see Bottoms and Tankebe 2012 on normative legitimacy versus empirical 
legitimacy and efficacy). 
The formal authorities also prioritised efficacy in their accommodation of and reliance on 
extralegal governance, as the under-resourced and understaffed prison could not operate 
smoothly without a self-regulated prisoner body. In this concurrent governing (see Stephenson 
2017), the administration fully acknowledged and tolerated the informal hierarchy and normative 
system, despite an official  rhetoric of the harmfulness of ‘criminal traditions’ and a half-hearted 
coercion of the criminal elite (see Slade 2016 on the concerted attack on the criminal elite in 
Georgia; cf. Oleinik 2006). For example, the administrators ignored the physical segregation of 
the outcasts and generally governed through the traditional prisoner institution rather than around 
it (see DiIulio 1987), engendering an integrated power structure and an overlapping social order 
(Stephenson 2017). 
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Underworld Metamorphosis and Prison Order under Threat 
My discussions with officers at the Academy and my observations at the study prison suggest the 
Ukrainian version of carceral self-rule has been facing considerable challenges, despite being 
both functional and deeply institutionalised. The prestige and power of the criminal elite has 
been eroding for both structural and personal reasons. First, many prisoners had vivid memories 
of the austerity and brutality of late Soviet and early post-independence imprisonment when the 
criminal elite had much to offer vis-à-vis the state. However, with the liberalised prison regime, 
many prisoners, for example, no longer depend on the mutual-aid fund, as food rations are much 
better than 15 years ago and the UkrPS has suspended the limit on food parcels from relatives. 
Second, whereas in the past, early release was rare and required total submission to the 
authorities, it now constitutes a realistic goal for most prisoners. If a prisoner is not a persistent 
rule violator, does not refuse to work, and does not belong to the criminal-elite, he stands a good 
chance of being paroled. This requires closer association with the authorities, further 
undermining the need for prisoner solidarity, opposition to the administration, and commitment 
to the informal rules (Crewe 2009; Mathiesen 1965; cf. Bronson 2006 on the effect of the 
introduction of determinate sentences in Ohio).  
Third, brother organisations on the outside seem to show less support of the prison 
underworld elite. Following a crackdown on criminal bands in Ukraine in the 1990s, corrupt 
senior ranking members of law-enforcement agencies reportedly filled the vacuum (see 
Stephenson 2017 on a similar ‘reciprocal assimilation’ in Russia). These pérevertni, or 
‘werewolves’, are now said to collaborate with, or more often lead, organised criminal groups 
(The Weekly Mirror 05.02.2005; 11.09.2010). The new, less ideological criminal bosses seem to 
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have little interest in the petty criminals who wind up in prison, whilst serious offenders are 
likely to have their own political or financial resources to avoid arrest or incarceration in the first 
place (Symkovych 2017a). Because of this dwindling outside support, some opportunistic 
prisoners crossed the floor, abandoning the ranks of criminal elite to become collaborators.  
The weakened link between organised crime and the in-prison underworld, along with 
liberalised sentencing and parole regimes, has resulted in a change in the profile of the criminal 
elite in prisons. In the research prison, I found most members of the criminal elite were young, 
without much life experience, and purportedly drug users (see Bronson 2006). Prisoners and staff 
alike saw them as undeserving and as compromising traditional prisoner self-rule: 
 
These days a vor [‘thief’, the underworld elite] is afraid to go into a sorokóvka [a cell for 
40 prisoners in a remand prison]. Everybody’s got some imperfections – but these days 
vorý (‘thieves’) have too many of them. (Prisoner-lad) 
 
Ironically, the less punitive penal policies have made the status of the criminal elite more 
appealing and accessible to some prisoners (cf. Einat and Wall 2006 on meritocracy in status 
ascendancy in Israeli prisons). The prisoners and officers in my study shared the widespread 
belief that many recent criminal elite have chosen this role for romantic reasons, rather than for 
ideological resistance to the administration or concern for the welfare of fellow prisoners: 
 
If you’ve got a couple of years, sure, why not play in the smotryáshchy [informal 
adjudicator]? However, if your sentence is serious, most people go and look for a job [in 
prison industry]. (Prisoner-lad) 
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Not surprisingly, the changing demographics of informal adjudicators and structural shifts in 
prison regimes and organised crime have corroded extralegal governance. Those prisoners who 
felt themselves to be self-sufficient expressed scepticism about the fairness and personal qualities 
of the criminal elite (see Tamanaha 2004 on judges as the law personified). These sceptical 
prisoners not only refused to pay their tithe7 – one of the informal norms – but questioned the 
legitimacy of the criminal elite and the extralegal governance they were administering: 
 
No, not all prisoners take part in the informal mutual-aid fund. It’s [effectively] on a 
voluntary basis [now]. I personally don’t give anything to informal adjudicators. I despise 
them. If I see a prisoner who needs assistance, I’ll give him a pack of cigarettes, some tea 
or food. But I will never give a thing to the criminal elite [to re-distribute]. (Prisoner-lad) 
 
Although Skarbek (2014) develops Gambetta's theory (1993) by arguing that the advent 
of the immense illicit drug market in the US prisons following mass incarceration has 
strengthened the demand for extralegal governance, now administered by gangs, my findings 
show that the surge in drug use has actually undermined the power of the criminal elite. As in 
England (Crewe 2005; 2009), drug use among the Ukrainian criminal elite has caused their 
prestige to plummet. The prisoners saw them as weak, immoral, and unreliable: 
 
                                                          
7 Historically, prisoners contributed one tenth of their parcels to the mutual-aid fund. It could be a 
pair of socks, some tinned meat, but more often the prison informal currency, cigarettes.  
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You know what blatní [criminal elite] are called these days? Torbokhváty, bag-snatchers, 
which means the one who gets more bags [i.e. food parcels from the family] is a bigger 
criminal elite. (Prisoner-outcast) 
 
Informal adjudicators are a joke today. They are smack-heads. – Before, to be named a 
vor [the highest rank in the underworld hierarchy] or smotryáschy, one should have never 
worked, nor served in the military. A [member of criminal elite] could not be a barýga [a 
person who is involved in trading]; he couldn’t have a family. Even small things like 
having [body] piercing were not allowed. – They had to demonstrate that they were ready 
to die defending the vorovskáya idéya [criminal idea] and muzhykí (lads). Now they get 
to have mommies bringing them parcels with food and cigarettes or drugs. They are 
cowards, they even work [in prison industry]. (Prisoner-lad) 
 
As the structural base of the criminal elite’s power and legitimacy continues to shrink, 
prisoners increasingly question the authority of the informal adjudicator. For example, although 
the underworld norms prohibited the criminal elite from working in the prison industry as this 
signified cooperation with the authorities, many no longer refused to work, fearing their 
placement into a segregation unit or eventual resentencing (cf. Oleinik 2003; Varese 1998). 
Whilst they still did not work, the criminal elite had to pay prisoner-lads to produce the officially 
required quota (nórma výrobotky) on their behalf and team-leaders (bugrý, trustees in industry) 
for their connivance. Showing just how far their prestige has fallen, some prisoners regarded the 
criminal elite in the research prison as a discredited and too-comfortable opposition to the 
administration: 
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Before [a member of the] criminal elite would never speak to the master [prison 
commander] without two other [members of the criminal elite] [so there are no qualms 
about possible corruption or submission]. The other day I – an assistant of the 
administration! [collaborator] – had to wait for 30 minutes in the corridor because the 
informal adjudicator was drinking tea with the kum [Head of the Security Department]. 
It’s fucked up. Before it was a shame to be an informal adjudicator in the ‘red zone’, they 
[criminal elite] did everything possible and beyond to be transferred to a ‘black zone’. 
Today they would take it as punishment. Today’s informal adjudicators are not the old 
ones, the [criminal] tradition is dying. (Prisoner-collaborator) 
  
Such compromises, along with the perceived transformation of the face of the modern criminal 
elite, meant the informal adjudicators in the study prison could not necessarily rely on their 
charismatic authority. Yet if inter-prisoner conflicts could not be resolved through formal means, 
the deeply institutionalised and instrumental office of prisoner adjudicators continued to function 
(Gambetta 1993; Skarbek 2014). Even so, the criminal elite increasingly shared their previous 
powers with prisoner-collaborators (see Pallot and Piacentini 2012). For example, bed allocation 
was traditionally a prerogative of informal adjudicators. However, after the new prison 
commander began tightening control, orderlies (zavkhózy, prisoner-collaborators) allocated beds, 
often following recommendations from the prison’s Security Department. Nonetheless, this was 
presented to prisoners as the decision of the squad’s informal adjudicators, perhaps to avoid 
resistance to the increased interference of the authorities in areas previously left to prisoners’ 
self-administration. 
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Given that collaborators wielded real rather than symbolic power, ‘growing a goatie’,8 
i.e. crossing the floor, appeared to be a purely pragmatic decision. The authorities valued 
defectors from the criminal elite, especially those with charismatic and managerial qualities, thus 
leaving a void to be filled by pretentious younger prisoners (see Sparks et al. 1996 on ‘plastic 
gangsters’). Whereas ‘converted’ collaborators often dropped the excessive múrka/fénya slang 
common to the criminal elite, many preserved an elevated sense of personal dignity and a strong 
belief in personal responsibility, which once characterised the criminal elite. Some interviewed 
‘defectors’ maintained that becoming a collaborator was not a submission to the authorities, but a 
better means to put into practice their belief in prisoner solidarity and welfare (see Symkovych 
2017b).  
The inter-caste migration and the eroded legitimacy of extralegal governance have 
potential repercussions for prison order. First, as discussed, the authorities can demote and 
discard collaborators at whim. The volatility and decreased ‘democratic pedigree’ of officially 
sanctioned prisoner leaders who are appointed by the authorities may undermine the deeply 
institutionalised power arrangements, particularly prisoners’ private justice, and by extension, 
the stability of the prisoner universe. Second, having two informal prisoner power centres, the 
criminal elite and collaborators, has hitherto impeded monopolisation of power by a few 
prisoners, something that frequently leads to inter-prisoner brutality, abuse, and exploitation (see 
King and Valensia 2014 for graphic examples; also Cressey and Krassowski 1958; DiIulio 
1987). The trend of co-opting the criminal elite and depleting their prestige and power may ruin 
the tenuous power balance among prisoners. Collaborators and criminal elite both fulfil 
                                                          
8 ‘Goats’ (kozlý) is an argot term for collaborators.  
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managerial functions, formal and informal, counterbalancing each other’s power. However, 
concentrating all power in one group’s hands may transform current collaborators into Soviet 
zhúliki or Brazilian faxinas, whose task of securing order comes at the prohibitively high cost of 
prisoners’ safety and wellbeing (see DiIulio 1987).  
 
Conclusion 
As a case study in a single, somewhat atypical institution, this research entails obvious 
limitations, notably generalisability. Nevertheless, because I enjoyed relatively unobstructed 
movement in all parts of the prison for five months (arguably the first researcher to do so), the 
study offers important insights into the normative and practical operation of the post-Soviet 
prisoner power structure and the challenges it faces. Furthermore, my exposure to hundreds of 
officers from across Ukraine with whom I lived during the fieldwork presented a unique 
opportunity to discuss my emerging findings and compare the situation in other Ukrainian 
prisons of different security levels and with a different informal balance between prisoners and 
the administration (the so-called ‘red’ and ‘black zones’).   
The study provides empirical support of Gambetta's (1993) and Skarbek's (2014) theories 
of underworld governance. First, I demonstrate the convergence of supply and demand for 
protection and mediation that the underworld provides when the state fails to do so. The accepted 
– regardless of moral acceptability – carceral self-rule, despite its discriminatory character, has 
proved its instrumentality in sustaining order and curbing excesses of violence in a socially and 
spatially dense milieu of inevitable conflicts with limited staff presence. Most of my research 
participants recognised the functionality of the informal hierarchy and extralegal justice system 
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and complied for both normative and prudential reasons, especially the fear of swift and stern 
informal enforcement.9  
However, efficacy and popular acceptance of a governance model do not affirm 
legitimacy per se, although they may meet the minimum criteria for empirical legitimacy, which 
is contextual and contingent on manifold factors. In prisons, these factors not only include 
predictable routines or a relative cap on violence, but may also encompass fair treatment and 
dignity (Liebling 2004) – both clearly absent in the described governance model. Relatedly, 
whilst a general acceptance of the power arrangements at hand by the rulers and the ruled may 
indicate a measure of empirical legitimacy, to be normatively (‘truly’) legitimate, such 
arrangements and the social order they engender must meet external, independent standards: be 
they moral principles dominant in the wider society or expectations of outside audiences 
(Bottoms and Tankebe 2012; also Tamanaha 2004 on authority versus morality of law). 
My findings highlight the cost of any governance model. The described overreliance of 
the under-resourced administration on prisoner self-rule came at a high human and moral price, a 
finding that supports DiIulio's (1987) critique of the Sykesean resigned acceptance of shared 
governance. I observed a prisoner hierarchy that accepted, if not legitimised, violence, albeit in a 
regimented form and mostly as a deterrent, along with discrimination and dehumanisation of 
some prisoners for the alleged benefit of the majority (and the administration). The prison 
administration, its disapproving rhetoric notwithstanding, depended on and accommodated the 
informal prisoner hierarchy and its normative system, recognising that the under-resourced and 
                                                          
9 As Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) underscore, gauging the weight of ‘true legitimacy’ versus 
‘dull compulsion’ in people’s reasoning about compliance poses an empirical challenge. 
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understaffed prison would struggle to operate smoothly without prisoner self-rule, unless 
converted into what King and Elliott (1977) call an ‘electronic coffin’.10 However, devoting 
adequate resources and otherwise altering the demand for extralegal governance (DiIulio 1987; 
Skarbek 2014) is not on the agenda for Ukrainian authorities, thus extending their complicity in 
the institutionalised discrimination. Furthermore, the country is at war and suffers from immense 
corruption. Its resources are already stretched to accommodate other, more pressing, priorities, 
rendering a pursuit of a different governance model in its prisons unlikely. 
Second, the study provides strong evidence of the link between the inner prison world 
and external socio-legal structures. Penal reforms that have considerably alleviated the 
previously destitute state of prisoners, introduced shorter sentences, and offered opportunities for 
early release have combined to undermine, probably unintentionally, the prisoner model of 
extralegal governance. Whereas disempowered and impoverished prisoners of the past had little 
to lose, Ukrainian prisoners in the early twenty-first century have parole and privileges at stake 
(see Crewe 2009). This has weakened the need for collective survival and reduced prisoner 
loyalty to the informal prisoner power system.  
Third, whilst being functional and responding to the wider structural transformations, a 
prisoner organisation cannot be divorced from individual actors with unique biographies and 
characteristics (structuration theory par excellance, see Giddens 1984; also Crewe 2009; Skarbek 
2014; Sparks et al. 1996; Tamanaha 2004). I argue that the changing demographics of traditional 
                                                          
10 Skarbek (2014), whilst arguing for decarceration and the need for the state to shield adequately 
prisoners and their property to undermine the demand for gang protection, suggests, inter alia, 
such dubious measures as roving drones and in-cell cameras. 
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informal prisoner leaders have threatened the legitimacy of prisoner self-rule. Losing prestige 
because of the seismic developments in society-at-large, the criminal elite has seen an exodus of 
respected prisoners, who either defect to become trustees or withdraw from an active role in the 
‘society of captives’. Younger prisoners have been filling the void, but their lack of life 
experience, exacerbated by drug abuse, has undermined the legitimacy of extralegal governance. 
Many prisoners have been questioning the right of these neophyte criminal elites to command 
and adjudicate. If illicit drugs become widely available to prisoners, the informal governance 
system may prove unsustainable, as the need for drugs, coupled with a lack of fear of reprisals, 
will likely outweigh any formal, informal, or moral compliance (see Crewe 2005; 2009; Einat 
and Wall 2006). If Skarbek (2014) is correct, this may transform traditional self-rule into 
something akin to gang rule in US prisons. 
As the formal system fails to produce prisoner normative compliance, mediate most inter-
prisoner disputes, and police prisoners closely, the disintegration of the informal prisoner 
organisation threatens the collapse of the established integrated order in general. Neither 
prisoners nor the administration have resources to monopolise the provision of safety and 
arbitration. That the authorities will continue to compete against and cooperate with the 
underworld seems plausible. However, with the palpable demise of the criminal elite, 
cooperation is likely to be increasingly through prisoner trustees (collaborators). Whereas at the 
time of research, the power of the trustees counterbalanced that of the criminal elite, the demise 
of the latter is likely to strengthen the position of the former. International experience 
demonstrates that such concentration of power is prone to abuse (see King and Valensia 2014 
and DiIulio 1987). The irony is that whilst the official discourse presents the ‘criminal 
traditions’, i.e. the informal prisoner structure and its normative system, as counter-productive to 
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‘correction’ and, more importantly, to order, order hinges on the existence of the informal power 
structure of the underworld and its extralegal system – at least as long as the state fails to provide 
an alternative to the underworld’s provision of protection and arbitration. 
Further research in other Ukrainian prisons, especially in ‘black zones’ and prisons with 
serious drug problems, is essential to expand the argument and test my speculations. Although I 
recognise my sheer luck in achieving and sustaining prolonged and mostly unobstructed access, 
the value of the data I obtained with the acceptance and trust of the research participants cannot 
be overemphasised, especially when opportunities for ethnographic studies elsewhere have been 
dwindling (Wacquant 2002).  
Finally, as the former Soviet republics have been pursuing increasingly divergent 
political paths and penal policies, the region offers a unique opportunity to study the effect of 
external structures on the previously (nearly) uniform prison world of the former USSR. Thus, 
this study, despite its limitations, contributes to the accumulation of the comparative descriptive 
material for such a task. 
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